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THE U.S. APPROACH TO SWAPS REGULATION: 
STRIKING A BALANCE BETWEEN DOMESTIC AND 
FOREIGN INTERESTS 
 
Julia H. Iodice∗ 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
The swaps market, a market where financial instruments 
are backed by cash flow agreements, has become a major concern 
for both domestic and international governments because of its 
ability to adversely impact the world’s financial security. 1  The 
more than $600 trillion swaps market2 has become the focus of 
government intervention and public attention as financial markets 
struggle to emerge from the worst crisis since the Great 
Depression.3  Although swaps played an integral role in the 
collapse of Lehman Brothers, and negatively impacted a number of 
other global financial institutions, the fall of American 
International Group, Inc. (“AIG”) in September 2008 is the most 
prominent example of how destructive swaps were during the 
financial crisis.4  AIG’s $526 billion portfolio of credit default 
swaps was the key factor that led to its demise.5  Prior to the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
*J.D., 2013, St. John's University School of Law; B.A., Classical Cultures & 
Society, 2008, Haverford College. The author thanks Professor Francis J. 
Facciolo for his guidance throughout the writing process and her family and 
friends for their patience and support.∗  
1 A swap is a type of derivative financial instrument involving an exchange of 
cash flows that are dependent upon some other factor such as currency exchange 
rates or the underlying price of a commodity. The Commodity Exchange Act 
provides an extensive definition of the term in §1a(47)(A). 7 U.S.C.A. § 
1a(47)(A). 
2 Carla Main, Swaps Rules, U.A.E. Debt, Basel Deadline: Compliance, 
BLOOMBERG (Oct. 12, 2012, 8:34 AM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-
10-12/swaps-rules-u-a-e-debt-basel-deadline-compliance.html. 
3 Gary Gensler, Chairman, U.S. Commodities Futures Trading Comm’n, The 
New Era of Swaps Market Reform – Keynote Address before the George 
Washington University Center for Law, Economics and Finance Conference 
(Oct. 10, 2012) (transcript available at http://www.cftc.gov/PressRoom/ 
SpeechesTestimony/opagensler-124). 
4 Cross-Border Application of Certain Swaps Provisions of the Commodity 
Exchange, 77 Fed. Reg. 41214, 41215 (proposed Jul. 12, 2012). 
5 William K. Sjostrom, Jr., The AIG Bailout, 66 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 943, 945 
(2009). 
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collapse, AIG had a global presence with businesses in 130 
countries.6  Experts speculated that because AIG’s market share of 
the swaps industry was so vast and globally connected, its inability 
to satisfy its credit default swap claims could have caused a 
“domino effect of failures” to spread to other institutions around 
the world.7  In September 2008, concern over the disastrous effect 
that AIG’s bankruptcy would have on the global financial markets 
prompted the United States government to make an unprecedented 
loan to AIG, totaling more than $85 billion dollars, to prevent the 
insurance giant from defaulting on its obligations.8  Subsequent 
cash infusions from the federal government were made as AIG 
continued to falter, bringing the final amount of the bailout up to 
$182 billion.9  While many institutions accepted government 
bailout money during the financial crisis, AIG’s bailout was 
considered to be “the most loathed of the rescues.”10 
In the wake of the 2008 crisis, U.S. regulators began 
implementing reforms to the existing regulatory framework in 
order to address systemic risks and prevent future economic crises 
of the magnitude experienced over the last few years.11  The Dodd-
Frank Consumer Protection and Wall Street Reform Act (“Dodd-
Frank”), signed into law by President Barack Obama on July 21, 
2010, was intended to remedy “the deficiencies in the regulatory 
system that contributed to the financial crisis.”12  However, the 
global nature of the financial industry has added a layer of 
complexity to developing an improved regulatory scheme.  As the 
Commodity Futures Trading Commission (the “CFTC”) has 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6 Monica Langley, et al., Bad Best and Cash Crunch Pushed Ailing AIG to 
Brink, WALL ST. J. (Sept. 18, 2008). 
7 Sjostrom, Jr., supra note 5, at 978.  
8 Id. at 976; see also Cross-Border Application of Certain Swaps Provisions of 
the Commodity Exchange, supra note 4, at 41215. 
9 Michael J. De La Merced & Ben Protess, A.I.G. Says It Will Not Join Lawsuit 
Against Government, N.Y. TIMES DEALBOOK, at B1 (Jan. 10, 2013). 
10 Andrew Ross Sorkin, Plot Twist in the AIG Bailout: It Actually Worked, N.Y. 
TIMES DEALBOOK, at B1 (Sept. 10, 2012) (The AIG bailout was the largest of its 
kind in United States history and was predicted to result in heavy losses for the 
federal government. This prompted a very critical public response). 
11 See The Dodd-Frank Consumer Protection and Wall Street Reform Act of 
2010, Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376. 
12 Cross-Border Application of Certain Swaps Provisions of the Commodity 
Exchange, supra note 4, at 41216; see also Troy S. Brown, Legal Political 
Moral Hazard: Does the Dodd- Frank Act End Too Big to Fail?, 3 ALA. C.R. & 
C.L.L. REV. 1, 1 (2012). 
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asserted, “corporate structures and inter-affiliate obligations may 
cause the activity, regardless of where that activity took place, to 
have a direct and significant connection with activities in, or effect 
on commerce in the U.S.”13  
AIG once again exemplifies this issue.  The swaps 
transactions that brought down AIG were entered into by one of its 
subsidiaries, AIG Financial Products.14  Although it was 
headquartered in the United States, AIG Financial Products was 
largely operated in London and traded through a French bank, 
Banque AIG.15  The substantial losses AIG Financial Products 
suffered from these transactions caused the credit rating 
downgrade of AIG because AIG was a guarantor of its subsidiary’s 
swaps.16  This in turn resulted in collateral calls and a liquidity 
crisis for the parent corporation.17 
The events surrounding AIG’s failure illustrate the nature 
in which the financial industry functions and transacts across 
national borders, and how these activities in foreign jurisdictions 
can profoundly affect the U.S. economy, and vice versa.18  As 
CFTC Chairman Gary Gensler stated, “During a default or crisis, 
risk knows no geographic border.”19  The danger that negative 
effects will spread across national economies is particularly 
prevalent in the swaps industry given that swaps transactions often 
involve parties who are domiciled in different countries and, for 
much of their existence, have gone generally unregulated as 
opaque over-the-counter transactions.20  Accordingly, U.S. 
policymakers and regulators have made swaps a priority of the 
post-financial crisis reforms. 
The U.S. was not alone in identifying regulatory 
deficiencies with respect to swaps and derivatives in general. Prior 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13 Cross-Border Application of Certain Swaps Provisions of the Commodity 
Exchange, supra note 4, at 41215–41216. 
14 Id. at 41215. 
15 Id. 
16 Id. 
17 Id. 
18 See id. (discussing the billion dollar trading loss that U.S. bank J.P. Morgan 
suffered due to activity in its London office). 
19 Gary Gensler, Chairman, U.S. Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n, Address 
Securities Industry and Financial Markets Association’s 2012 Annual Meeting 
(Oct. 23, 2012) (transcript available at http://www.cftc.gov/PressRoom/ 
SpeechesTestimony/opagensler-125). 
20 Cross-Border Application of Certain Swaps Provisions of the Commodity 
Exchange, supra note 4, at 41216. 
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to 2008, the European Union, along with countries such as Canada 
and Japan, generally did not regulate swaps.21  However, in the 
aftermath of the global financial crisis, the international 
community agreed that the swaps industry needed oversight and 
increased transparency.22  At the 2009 G20 Summit in Pittsburgh, 
members expressed a commitment to regulate the over-the-counter 
(“OTC”) derivatives industry in the following three ways: 23 (1) 
OTC derivatives contracts should be reported to trade repositories; 
(2) all standardized OTC derivatives contracts should be cleared 
through central counterparties and traded on exchanges or 
electronic trading platforms, where appropriate, by the end of 
2012; and (3) non-centrally cleared contracts should be subject to 
higher capital requirements.24  The first requirement will provide 
greater transparency by aggregating data at trade repositories.  The 
call for centralized clearing is a direct response to the AIG collapse 
as it is intended to avoid the concentration of risk within large 
institutions that are heavily interconnected with other institutions 
both domestically and internationally.25  Instead, the risk will lie 
with the clearinghouses,26 which should be better positioned to 
handle it.27  Mandatory clearing of swaps should also improve 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
21 Gary Gensler, Chairman, U.S. Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n, 
Remarks before Ontario Securities Commission (OSC), OSC Dialogue 2012 in 
Toronto, Canada (Oct. 30, 2012) (transcript available at http://www.cftc.gov/ 
PressRoom/SpeechesTestimony/opagensler-126). 
22 Gensler, supra note 19. 
23 The G20, whose members represent 90% of global GDP, is a “forum for 
international cooperation” that seeks to coordinate policies to achieve and 
promote a stable global economy.  The G20 includes Argentina, Australia, 
Brazil, Canada, China, France, Germany, India, Indonesia, Italy, Japan, Mexico, 
Republic of Korea, Russia, Saudi Arabia, South Africa, Turkey, United 
Kingdom, United States, and the European Union. See What is the G20?, G20 
(March 10, 2013), http://www.g20.org/index.php. 
24 Cross-Border Application of Certain Swaps Provisions of the Commodity 
Exchange, supra note 4, at 41216. 
25 See Philip Stafford, Blizzard of Regulation has its Effect, FIN. TIMES (Oct. 29, 
2012, 8:12PM), http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/3da86288-19d7-11e2-a179-00144 
feabdc0.html#axzz2DJIUDIZj. 
26 A clearinghouse serves as an intermediary for counterparties to a transaction 
by acting as a buyer for the party looking to sell and a seller for the party 
looking to buy. Kristin N. Johnson, Clearinghouse Governance: Moving Beyond 
Cosmetic Reform, 77 BROOK. L. REV. 681, 693 (2012). 
27 The Risk in Clearing Houses: All Clear?, THE ECONOMIST (Apr. 7, 2012), 
http://www.economist.com/node/21552209; see also Matthew Leising, 
Clearinghouses Should Divulge More Risk Information, Report Says, 
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transparency, make it more difficult for a counterparty to avoid 
maintaining the required collateral, and offer insurance for a non-
defaulting party.28  Finally, higher capital requirements for 
uncleared swaps will ensure that the entities engaged in 
transactions without the protections of a clearinghouse have 
sufficient collateral to reduce the risk of default. 
While the G20 members continue to affirm their 
commitment to the principles set forth at the 2009 Summit, 
differing “cultures, legal and political traditions, and financial 
systems” have produced challenges in actually harmonizing new 
regulatory frameworks.29  These issues have been further 
complicated by the fact that each country is operating at its own 
pace in drafting and implementing regulations.30  During 2012, the 
CFTC made a push to finalize its new swaps regulatory framework 
before the end of year in accordance with the deadline set at the 
2009 G20 Summit.  While some provisions went into effect before 
the planned deadline,31 considerable debate emerged regarding 
what form regulations should take and how far national regulators 
should reach beyond their borders to regulate foreign entities 
engaged in swaps activities. 
On July 12, 2012, the CFTC published “Proposed Guidance 
on the Cross-Border Application of Certain Swaps Provisions of 
the Commodity Exchange Act” (the “proposed guidance”).32  The 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
BLOOMBERG (Feb. 5, 2013), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-02-
05/clearinghouses-should-divulge-more-risk-information-report-says.html. 
28 The Risk in Clearing Houses: All Clear?, supra note 27. 
29 Cross-Border Application of Certain Swaps Provisions of the Commodity 
Exchange, supra note 4, at 41216;  see also Press Release, Joint Press Statement 
of Leaders on Operating Principles and Areas of Exploration in the Regulation 
of the Cross-Border OTC Derivatives Market, Release PR6439-12, Dec. 4, 
2012, http://www.cftc.gov/PressRoom/PressReleases/pr6439-12. 
30 See Press Release PR6439-12, supra note 29. 
31 For example, the requirement to register with the CFTC went into force last 
year for the foreign operations of U.S. financial institutions like Goldman Sachs 
Inc. but an exemptive order issued by the agency has delayed the effective date 
of a number of other provisions dealing with non-U.S. institutions. See CFTC 
Approves Exemptive Order on Cross-Border Application of the Swaps 
Provisions of Dodd-Frank, Release PR6478-12, Dec. 21, 2012, 
http://www.cftc.gov/PressRoom/PressReleases/pr6478-12; see also Silla Brush, 
Dodd-Frank Swap Rules Delayed Six Months for Overseas Trades, BLOOMBERG 
(Dec. 22, 2012), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-12-21/dodd-frank-
swaps-rules-delayed-six-months-for-overseas-trades.html. 
32 See generally Cross-Border Application of Certain Swaps Provisions of the 
Commodity Exchange, supra note 4. 
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proposed guidance was intended to remedy the uncertainty 
surrounding how non-U.S. entities would be regulated under the 
new framework.33  However, the proposed guidance received 
considerable criticism, particularly from foreign regulators who 
believed that the CFTC’s proposed approach was too far reaching 
and would interfere with the ability of foreign nations’ to regulate 
entities domiciled within their own jurisdictions.34  Market 
participants that anticipated being regulated under the new U.S. 
framework also expressed concern over the costs and 
impracticalities of compliance.35  
Part of the proposed guidance suggested a measure referred 
to as “substituted compliance.”  Substituted compliance would 
exempt a non-U.S. swaps dealer,36 or major swap participant 
(“MSP”),37 from certain requirements mandated by the CFTC if 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
33 See generally id. 
34 See Comment for Proposed Rule 77 Fed. Reg. 41213, Jess Lee for Australian 
Securities and Investments Commission, Hong Kong Monetary Authority, 
Monetary Authority of Singapore, Reserve Bank of Australia, and Securities and 
Futures Commission, Hong Kong, Aug. 27, 2012, http://comments.cftc.gov/ 
PublicComments/ViewComment.aspx?id=58444;  see also Comment for 
Proposed Rule 77 Fed. Reg. 41213, French Minister of Economy and Finance, 
Chairmen of the Autortité de Contrôle Prudentiel, and Chairman of the Autorité 
de Marchés Financiers, Aug. 7, 2012, http://comments.cftc.gov/ 
PublicComments/ViewComment.aspx?id=58417& SearchText=. 
35 See Comment for Proposed Rule 77 Fed. Reg. 41213, R. Martin Chavez for 
Goldman Sachs, Aug. 27 2012, http://comments.cftc.gov/PublicComments/ 
ViewComment.aspx?id=58622& SearchText=;  see also Comment for Proposed 
Rule 77 Fed. Reg. 41213, Edward J. Rosen for Bank of America Merrill Lynch, 
Barclays Capital, BNP Paribas, Citi, Credit Agricole Corporate and Investment 
Bank, Credit Suisse Securities (USA), Deutsche Bank AG, HSBC, Morgan 
Stanley, Standard Chartered Bank, UBS AG, Wells Fargo & Company, Aug. 16, 
2012, http://comments.cftc.gov/PublicComments/ViewComment.aspx?id= 
58396&SearchText=. 
36 The Commodity Exchange Act [hereinafter “CEA”] defines a “swap dealer” 
as any person who (i) holds itself out as a dealer in swaps; (ii) makes a market in 
swaps; (iii) regularly enters into swaps with counterparties as an ordinary course 
of business for its own account; or (iv) engages in any activity causing the 
person to be commonly known in the trade as a dealer or market maker in 
swaps, provided however, in no event shall an insured depository institution be 
considered to be a swap dealer to the extent it offers to enter into a swap with a 
customer in connection with originating a loan with that customer. 7 U.S.C. § 
1a(49)(A) (2008). 
37 The CEA defines a “major swap participant” as “any person who is not a swap 
dealer, and (i) maintains a substantial position in swaps for any of the major 
swap categories as determined by the Commission, excluding (I) positions held 
for hedging or mitigating commercial risk; and (II) positions maintained by any 
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the regulatory framework of that non-U.S. entity’s home 
jurisdiction was deemed comparable to the U.S. scheme.38  While 
foreign regulators agreed that those exemptions were appropriate, 
they questioned the limited manner in which the CFTC proposed to 
apply substituted compliance.39  As initially proposed, substituted 
compliance would still subject many non-U.S. firms to the 
regulations of multiple jurisdictions and likely result in dual 
compliance obligations that could prove expensive or altogether 
impossible to satisfy because of conflicting requirements.40  
After closing the comment period for the proposed 
guidance on August 27, 2012, the CFTC began finalizing its 
approach.41  As many of the swaps provisions were set to enter into 
force on October 12, 2012, the CFTC initially issued a series of no 
action letters indicating that it would refrain from recommending 
enforcement actions against certain foreign entities through the end 
of 2012.42  The agency followed up the October no action letters 
with an exemptive order issued on December 21, 2012, which 
allowed non-U.S. entities that registered with the CFTC as swap 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
employee benefit plan (or any contract held by such a plan) as defined in 
paragraphs (3) and (32) of section 1002 of Title 29 for the primary purpose of 
hedging or mitigating any risk directly associated with the operation of the plan; 
(ii) whose outstanding swaps create substantial counterparty exposure that could 
have serious adverse effects on the financial stability of the United States 
banking system or financial markets; or (iii) (I) is a financial entity that is highly 
leveraged relative to the amount of capital it holds and that is not subject to 
capital requirements established by an appropriate Federal banking agency; and 
(II) maintains a substantial position in outstanding swaps in any major swap 
category as determined by the Commission.” 7 U.S.C. § 1a (33)(A) (2008). 
38 Memorandum from Shearman & Sterling, LLP, Cross-Border Application of 
the Swaps Provisions of the Dodd-Frank Act, 5 (July 18, 2012), 
http://www.shearman.com/Cross-Border-Application-of-the-Swaps-Provisions-
of-the-Dodd-Frank-Act-07-18-2012/. 
39 Comment for Proposed Rule 77 Fed. Reg. 41213, Steven Maijoor for the 
European Securities and Markets Authority (ESMA), Aug. 27, 2012, 
http://comments.cftc.gov/PublicComments/ViewComment.aspx?id=58451&Sea
rchText=. 
40 Id. 
41 U.S. Commodity Futures Trading Commission, Comments for Proposed Rule 
77 FR 41213, 
http://comments.cftc.gov/PublicComments/CommentList.aspx?id=1234. 
42 CFTC’s Division of Swap Dealer and Intermediary Oversight Issues No-
Action Letter Regarding the Swaps Calculation by Certain Foreign Entities for 
Purposes of the Swap Dealer and Major Swap Participant Definitions, Release 
PR6390-12, Oct. 12, 2012, http://www.cftc.gov/PressRoom/PressReleases/ 
pr6390-12. 
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dealers or MSPs to delay compliance with a number of the new 
regulatory requirements until July 12, 2013.43  Based on remarks 
from Chairman Gensler, the exemptive order was issued, at least in 
part, so as to allow for greater consideration of how the CFTC will 
regulate overseas branches of U.S. entities and how it will apply 
substituted compliance.44 
Faced with the expiration of the December 2012 exemptive 
order, the CFTC issued the final version of its interpretive 
guidance (the “final interpretive guidance”) on July 12, 2013.45  
The interpretive guidance addressed many of the concerns that 
critics expressed regarding the proposed guidance and reflects a 
last minute agreement regarding joint cooperation between the 
swaps regulators in the U.S. and the European Union.46  However, 
the final interpretive guidance does not resolve all of the potential 
issues created by the new regulations.  Rather, it states that it will 
address any such conflicts, if and when they arise. 
Part I of this paper will outline the key provisions of the 
new swaps regulations and discuss the CFTC’s interpretive 
guidance with respect to the extraterritorial reach of these 
provisions in greater detail.  Part II will argue that, although the 
CFTC chose the correct medium to provide insight into how it will 
enforce the swaps regulations, in order to better address the 
concerns of foreign regulators and market participants, and 
implement the most effective regulatory framework possible, the 
U.S. should work quickly with its foreign counterparts to develop 
an explicit and internationally harmonized policy regarding the use 
of substituted compliance.  Part II will further argue that the U.S. 
should establish a presumption in favor of granting substituted 
compliance to entities registered with other G20 members who 
have committed and continue to maintain a commitment to the 
principles set forth at the 2009 G20 Summit. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
43 CFTC Approves Exemptive Order on Cross-Border Application of the Swaps 
Provisions of Dodd-Frank, Release PR6478-12, Dec. 21, 2012, 
http://www.cftc.gov/PressRoom/PressReleases/pr6478-12. 
44 See Brush, supra note 31. 
45 Interpretive Guidance and Policy Statement Regarding Compliance with 
Certain Swap regulations; Rule, 78 Fed. Reg. 45292 (Jul. 26, 2013). 
46 Silla Brush & Jim Brunsden, Cross-Border Swaps Deal to End U.S.-Europe 
Regulation Overlap, BLOOMBERG (Jul. 22, 2013), http://www.bloomberg.com/ 
news/2013-07-11/cross-border-swaps-deal-to-end-u-s-eu-regulation-
overlap.html. 
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I. THE NEW REGULATORY FRAMEWORK 
 
A swap can be broadly defined as “an agreement between 
parties to exchange cash flows over a period of time.”47  Swaps 
generally fit into the following five categories: commodity, credit, 
currency, equity, or interest rate.48  Businesses began using swaps 
in the 1980s to manage risks related to fluctuating commodities 
prices, currency rates, and interest rates.49  Swaps allowed 
participants to customize their risk management because the 
transacting parties set the terms of each swap transaction.50  As a 
newer product that resided outside the scope of the 1930s era 
financial legislation, swaps were not subject to reporting 
requirements that provide greater transparency in other sectors of 
the financial industry.51  Title VII of Dodd-Frank specifically 
addressed this regulatory gap with respect to swaps.52  However, 
Title VII left a great deal of discretion to the CFTC and the 
Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”) to promulgate 
regulations that will determine exactly how swaps will be 
regulated.53 
In conjunction with the implementation of the broader 
policies set forth in Dodd-Frank, the CFTC and the SEC have 
partnered to develop comprehensive regulations to oversee the 
swaps industry.54  Congress provided the CFTC with authority 
over swaps that are based on securities indices or government 
securities, while the SEC was given the power to oversee security-
based swaps, meaning those swaps that are based on a single 
security or a narrow index of securities.55  This division gives the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
47 Procter & Gamble Co. v. Bankers Trust Co., 925 F. Supp. 1270, 1275 (S.D. 
Ohio 1996). 
48 Christopher T. Fowler, The Swaps Push-Out Rule: An Impact Assessment, 15 
N.C. BANKING INST. 205, 207 (2011). 
49 Gensler, supra note 3. 
50 Michael Mackenzie & Gregory Meyer, US Swaps Shake-Up Set to Boost 
Exchanges, FIN. TIMES, (Nov. 2, 2012, 5:32 PM), http://www.ft.com/ 
intl/cms/s/0/cadeef74-2377-11e2-a46b-
00144feabdc0.html?siteedition=intl&siteedition=intl#axzz2eJlSViJ2. 
51 See Gensler, supra note 3. 
52 Id. 
53 Id. 
54 Id. 
55 Memorandum from Davis Polk & Wardwell, LLP, Summary of Dodd-Frank 
Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Enacted into Law on July 21, 
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CFTC authority over approximately ninety-five percent of the 
swaps market.56  Therefore, this paper will primarily focus on 
Dodd-Frank’s amendments to the Commodity Exchange Act and 
the actions taken by the CFTC, as these matters will have the 
greatest impact on the swaps industry. 
 
A. Amendments to the Commodity Exchange Act 
 
Section 731 of Dodd-Frank amended Section 4s of the 
Commodity Exchange Act (the “CEA”).57  Section 4s(a) prohibits 
any person from acting as a swap dealer or MSP unless registered 
with the CFTC.58  Section 4s(b) requires swap dealers and MSPs to 
file a registration application with the CFTC in accordance with 
the rules promulgated by the CFTC.59  Section 4s also authorizes 
the CFTC to promulgate rules relating to capital and margin, 
reporting and record keeping, daily trading records, business 
conduct standards, documentation standards, duties, designation of 
a chief compliance officer, and segregation of uncleared swaps.60  
Furthermore, Section 4s(b)(6) makes it unlawful for a swap 
dealer or MSP to permit any person associated with a statutorily 
disqualified swap dealer or MSP to effect or be involved in 
effecting swaps on behalf of it if the swap dealer or MSP knew, or 
should have known, of the disqualification.61  Sections 8(a)(2) and 
8(a)(3) provide grounds pursuant to which the CFTC may reject 
registration, including felony convictions and securities laws 
violations.62  In addition to the registration, clearing, and reporting 
requirements, amendments to the CEA also provide the CFTC with 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2010, 53 (July 21, 2010), http://www.davispolk.com/dodd-frank/memoranda/ 
derivatives/. 
56 Alexandra Alper & Sarah N. Lynch, Regulators Spare All but Biggest Swap 
Dealers, REUTERS (Apr. 18, 2012, 6:53 PM), http://www.reuters.com/ 
article/2012/04/18/us-financial-regulation-swaps-idUSBRE83H0YE20120418. 
57 Commodity Exchange Act, 7 U.S.C. § 4s (1982); see also Commodity Futures 
Trading Commission, Office of Public Affairs, “Fact Sheet: Final Regulations 
Regarding Registration of Swap Dealers and Major Swap Participants,” 
http://www.cftc.gov/LawRegulation/DoddFrankAct/Rulemakings/DF_1_Registr
ation/index.htm. 
58 Registration of Swap Dealers and Major Swap Participants, 77 Fed. Reg. 
2613, 2614 (proposed Jan. 19, 2012) (to be codified at 77 C.F.R. pt. 1). 
59 Id. 
60 Id. 
61 Id. at 2613. 
62 Id. at 2614. 
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enhanced rulemaking and enforcement authority with respect to all 
registered entities and intermediaries subject to its oversight.63  
 
B. The Cross-Border Reach 
 
Section 722(d) of Dodd-Frank amends Section 2(i) of the 
CEA to specify the Act’s jurisdictional reach. Section 2(i) now 
states that the Act:  
 
[S]hall not apply to activities outside the United 
States unless those activities: (1) have a direct 
and significant connection with activities in, or 
effect on, commerce of the United States; or (2) 
contravene such rules or regulations as the 
Commission may prescribe or promulgate as are 
necessary or appropriate to prevent the evasion 
of any provision of this chapter that was enacted 
by [Dodd-Frank].64 
 
Thus, Congress explicitly authorized the CFTC to use its discretion 
to regulate foreign swaps activity particularly where the activity 
has a “direct and significant connection” to the U.S. economy.  
This grant of broad authority is undoubtedly a product of the 
policy concern that threats posed by investment products like 
swaps are not confined to the activities of U.S. entities. It permits 
the CFTC to issue regulations with the goal of reducing systemic 
risks.  The CFTC is, thereby, empowered to oversee the activities 
of entities that would otherwise have been outside the scope of its 
jurisdictional authority.  Congress, undoubtedly, wanted to ensure 
that the new regulatory framework would cover an entity like AIG 
Financial Products whose swaps transactions were a major factor 
in the collapse of AIG despite the fact that the company operated 
out of London and conducted its trades through a French bank.65  
The latitude of Section 2(i) provides the CFTC with the tools to do 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
63 Press Release, Sec. and Exch. Comm’n, SEC Adopts Rule Defining Swaps-
Related Terms for Regulating Derivatives (Apr. 18, 2012), available at 
http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2012/2012-67.htm. 
64 7 U.S.C. §2(i) (2010). 
65 Gary Gensler, Chairman, U.S. Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n., 
Commodities and Futures Comm’n, Statement of Support (June 29, 2012) 
(transcript available at http://www.cftc.gov/PressRoom/SpeechesTestimony/ 
genslerstatement062912). 
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so. 
 While Congress generally granted the CFTC broad 
discretion regarding the regulation of foreign entities, and the 
transactions in which they engage, it did limit the agency in one 
respect. Section 752(a) of Dodd-Frank provides that U.S. 
regulators: 
 
Shall consult and coordinate with foreign 
regulatory authorities on the establishment of 
consistent international standards with respect to 
the regulation (including fees) of swaps, 
security-based swaps, swap entities, and 
security-based swap entities and may agree to 
such information- sharing arrangements as may 
be deemed to be necessary or appropriate in the 
public interest or for the protection of investors, 
swap counterparties, and security-based swap 
counterparties.66 
 
Through this provision, Congress directed the CFTC to work with 
its foreign counterparts in developing the new swaps regulations.  
Yet, the mandate only requires such coordination where it is 
“deemed to be necessary,” once again granting the CFTC 
discretion to determine whether acting unilaterally or coordinating 
with foreign regulators is in the  best interest of the U.S.  The 
CFTC has acknowledged that Dodd-Frank authorized it to regulate 
swaps beyond U.S. borders, but has also indicated that in doing so 
it “will be guided by consideration of international comity 
principles.”67  In other words, the CFTC expressed sensitivity 
towards the interests of its foreign counterparts with respect to 
regulating entities domiciled outside of the U.S. In order to fulfill 
its statutory mandates, the CFTC must therefore strike a balance 
between reducing risks to the U.S. markets and deferring to foreign 
regulators within their own jurisdictions. 
 
C. The Significance of a “U.S. Person” 
 
The proposed guidance stated that where a foreign swaps 
dealer engages in $8 billion or more in swaps transactions with 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
66 See Dodd-Frank Act, §725(a) (2010); see also 15 U.S.C. §8325(a) (2010). 
67 Cross-Border Application of Certain Swaps Provisions of the Commodity 
Exchange, supra note 4, at 41217–41218. 
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entities that are considered “U.S. persons,” it must register 
pursuant to the CFTC’s registration rules.68  Accordingly, 
determining whether a foreign swaps dealer exceeds the $8 billion 
de minimis threshold and, therefore, whether it must register with 
the CFTC and be subject to the regulatory requirements of the 
CEA turns on whether the counterparty to a given transaction is a 
“U.S. person.”69  The final interpretive guidance further clarifies 
the definition but does not change the significance of the term 
“U.S, person” in this context.70  As the European Commission put 
it, the “definition determines the territorial scope of the Dodd-
Frank Act.”71  
The final interpretive guidance indicates that the CFTC 
considers the term “U.S. person” to encompass, non-exclusively 
the following: (i) any natural person who is a resident of the U.S.; 
(ii) any estate of a decedent who was a resident of the U.S. at the 
time of death; (iii) any legal entity other than an entity described in 
(iv) or (v) that is organized or incorporated under the laws of a 
state or other jurisdiction in the U.S. or having its principal place 
of business in the U.S.; (iv) any pension plan for employees, 
officers or principals of a legal entity described in (iii), unless the 
pension plan is primarily for foreign employees of such entity; (v) 
any trust governed by the laws of a state or other jurisdiction in the 
U.S., if a court within the U.S. is able to exercise primary 
supervision over the administration of the trust; (vi) any 
investment fund or other collective investment vehicle that is not 
described in (iii) and that is majority-owned by one or more 
persons described in (i), (ii), (iii), (iv), or (v) (where “majority-
owned” means beneficial ownership of more than fifty percent of 
the equity or voting interest in the vehicle) except any vehicle that 
is publicly offered only to non-U.S. persons and not offered to U.S. 
persons; (vii) any legal entity that is directly or indirectly majority-
owned by one or more persons described in (i), (ii), (iii), (iv), or 
(v) and in which such person(s) bears unlimited responsibility for 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
68 Id. at 41218 (noting that when a person engages in a swap transaction above a 
“de minimis threshold,” that person is required to register as a swap dealer under 
the Commodity Exchange Act). 
69 Id. 
70 Interpretive Guidance and Policy Statement Regarding Compliance with 
Certain Swap regulations, supra note 45, at 45316. 
71 Comment for Proposed Rule 77 Fed. Reg. 41213, Jonathan Faull for the 
European Commission, Aug. 24, 2012, http://comments.cftc.gov/ 
PublicComments/ViewComment.aspx?id=58431&SearchText=. 
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the obligations and liabilities of the legal entity; and (viii) any 
individual account or joint account (discretionary or not) where the 
beneficial owner (or one of the beneficial owners in the case of a 
joint accounts) is a person described in (i), (ii), (iii), (iv), (vi), or 
(vii).72  
The proposed guidance had included within its definition of 
a U.S. person any foreign branch or agent of a U.S. person, 
excluding a foreign affiliate or subsidiary of a U.S. person.73  This 
meant that, for example, an interest rate swap involving Euros 
between an EU based swaps dealer and a Citibank branch located 
in the EU could have been required to comply with CFTC 
regulations even though the entire transaction occurred in the EU 
and would have already been subject to the oversight of the 
European Securities and Markets Authority (the “ESMA”).74  This 
raised the concern that any entity subject to swaps regulations 
involving multiple jurisdictions could be required to not only 
comply with duplicative reporting requirements but also create an 
untenable situation where those entities would be required to 
comply with the clearing mandates of both jurisdictions.75  The 
result would be that, in the case of a transaction between a 
European entity and a U.S. entity, both EU and U.S. regulations 
could apply.76  Accordingly, an EU regulation requiring the 
European entity to clear the transaction through a European 
clearinghouse is incompatible with a CEA requirement that the 
U.S. party clear the transaction through a U.S. clearinghouse 
unless the clearinghouse were dually registered in the EU and 
U.S.77 Japan also intends to impose a requirement that certain 
transactions be cleared through a Japanese clearinghouse, which 
could conflict with U.S. clearing requirements.78  Additionally, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
72 Interpretive Guidance and Policy Statement, supra note 45, at 45316-17; see 
also Memorandum from Davis Polk & Wardwell, LLP, CFTC Finalizes Cross-
Border Swaps Guidance and Establishes Compliance Schedule, 2 (Jul. 30, 
2013), http://www.davispolk.com/sites/default/files/07.30.13.CFTC_.Cross 
_.Border_0.pdf 
73 Cross-Border Application of Certain Swaps Provisions of the Commodity 
Exchange, supra note 4, at 41218. 
74 See Memorandum from Shearman & Sterling, LLP, supra note 38. 
75 Id. 
76 Id. (discussing the possibility of conflicts that may arise in a transaction 
between a U.S. person and a non-U.S. person). 
77 Id.  
78 Comment for Proposed Rule 77 Fed. Reg. 41213, Chris Young for the 
International Swaps and Derivatives Association, Aug. 10, 2012, 
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reporting requirements could pose another unworkable conflict 
where, as is the case in France and Germany, the foreign entity’s 
home jurisdiction has more restrictive bank secrecy laws that 
would prohibit entities from disclosing the kind of information 
requested by the CFTC.79  
In the final interpretive guidance, the CFTC acknowledged 
this potential for conflict of laws issues by stating “The 
Commission is mindful of the challenges presented by such 
circumstances and continues to work on a bilateral and multilateral 
basis with foreign regulators to address these issues.”80  Despite 
this declaration, the CFTC provided no concrete answer as to how 
these conflicts will be resolved. The interpretive guidance merely 
states, “where a real conflicts of law exists the Commission 
strongly encourages regulators and registrants to consult directly 
with its staff” and that the Commission “may consider reasonable 
alternatives that allow the Commission to fulfill its mandate while 
respecting the regulatory interests of other jurisdiction.”81  
Essentially, the CFTC skirted the issue and indicated that it would 
address conflicts when they arise instead of providing a bright line 
rule for registrants, meaning registered swaps dealers and MSPs, to 
follow when they are faced with conflicting mandates. This lack of 
clarity will create further confusion and make additional work for 
the CFTC and the entities it regulates because it offers no actual 
guidance; only a statement that the CFTC “may consider” 
establishing some sort of exception for so called “real” conflicts.82  
 
D. The Consequences of the Proposed Definition of a “U.S. 
Person” 
 
In addition to the practical concerns related to complying 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
http://comments.cftc.gov/PublicComments/ViewComment.aspx?id=58356&Sea
rchText= (mentioning that Japan plans to create its own G-20 requirements 
demanding the use of a Japanese clearinghouse, which may conflict with U.S. 
requirements). 
79 Comment for Proposed Rule 77 Fed. Reg. 41213, French Minister of 
Economy and Finance, supra note 34, at 2; see also Comment for Proposed Rule 
77 Fed Reg. 41213, Tobias Unkelbach for the Association of German Banks, 
(Aug. 27, 2012), http://comments.cftc.gov/PublicComments/ViewComment. 
aspx?id=58450&SearchText=. 
80 Interpretive Guidance and Policy Statement, supra note 45, at 45345. 
81 Id.  
82 Id.  
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with the regulation of multiple jurisdictions, registration could also 
impose a heavy burden on foreign swaps dealers and MSPs given 
that registrants would be required to comply with certain “entity 
level” and “transaction level” requirements of the CEA unless the 
transaction fell within the scope of a designated exception.83  
“Entity level” requirements refer to the capital adequacy, risk 
management, chief compliance officer, and swap data reporting 
and record keeping requirements.84  “Transaction level” 
requirements relate to margin, clearing, segregation of uncleared 
swaps, trade execution, swap trading relationship documentation, 
portfolio reconciliation and compression, real-time public 
reporting, trade confirmation, daily trading records, and external 
business conduct standards.85  
The proposed guidance indicated that registered swap 
dealers would need to comply with all entity level requirements 
unless they were deemed to be regulated by a comparable foreign 
regulatory framework and consequently granted an exemption 
from the CFTC requirements through the mechanism of substituted 
compliance.86  Non-U.S. swaps dealers would still have to comply 
with all transaction level requirements when they engaged in 
transactions with persons or entities operating or incorporated in 
the U.S. or their foreign branches and for all transactions with 
overseas affiliates that are guaranteed by a U.S. entity.87  Swaps 
with U.S. persons or their overseas branches would also count 
toward the $8 billion de minimis registration threshold.88  Prior to 
the issuance of the finalized interpretive guidance in July 2013, 
foreign regulators noted that the potential for overlap, duplication, 
and conflict of laws would be maximized if the CFTC applied a 
broad definition of a “U.S. person” with limited opportunities for 
substituted compliance.89  A greater number of transactions would 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
83 Memorandum from Davis Polk & Wardwell, LLP, CFTC Cross-Border 
Guidance and Exemptive Order Proposals, 2 (July 3, 2012) 
http://www.davispolk.com/dodd-frank/memoranda/derivatives/. 
84 Memorandum from Davis Polk & Wardwell, LLP, supra note 72. 
85 Id. 
86 Cross-Border Application of Certain Swaps Provisions of the Commodity 
Exchange, supra note 4, at 41227. 
87 Memorandum from Shearman & Sterling, LLP, supra note 38. 
88 Cross-Border Application of Certain Swaps Provisions of the Commodity 
Exchange, supra note 4, at 41219. 
89 Comment for Proposed Rule 77 Fed. Reg. 41213, Jonathan Faull for the 
European Commission, supra note 71. 
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be counted in the $8 billion threshold, thereby requiring more non-
U.S. entities to register with the CFTC. Moreover, as the European 
Commissioner for Internal Market and Services, Michel Barnier 
argued such an expansive interpretation sends a message that 
“American rules would take primacy over those in Europe” and in 
other nations.90  Mr. Barnier also asserted that the efforts of 
regulators around the world to reform the swaps industry “will be 
in vain if we fail to realise that a global market can be regulated 
only by national rules that work together, closing gaps and 
avoiding overlaps.”91  Mr. Barnier’s remarks highlighted the 
inherent problem with the CFTC’s proposed guidance. U.S. 
regulators stated repeatedly that they are committed to 
coordinating with their foreign counterparts and emphasized that 
the systemic risk of swaps necessitates a unified solution.  
Nevertheless, the CFTC’s broad “U.S. person” definition and 
limited use of substituted compliance as set forth in the proposed 
guidance took a decidedly unilateral approach to regulating the 
swaps market.  
 
E. Substituted Compliance under the Proposed Guidance 
 
The proposed guidance indicated that a determination 
regarding the application of substituted compliance to a non-U.S. 
person would be made by the CFTC on a firm-by-firm basis - 
meaning each swaps entity would have to request that the 
exemption be applied to it - and the CFTC would have to analyze 
each case on an individual basis.92  According to the proposed 
guidance, exemptions would not apply to transaction-level 
requirements where the non-U.S. firm was engaging in business 
with an entity considered to be a U.S. person.93  One of the primary 
reasons that foreign regulators and market participants criticized 
the substituted compliance standard described in the proposed 
guidance was the firm-by-firm, rule-by-rule analysis for 
determining the comparability of a foreign jurisdiction’s 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
90 Michel Barnier, The US Must Not Override EU Regulators, FIN. TIMES (June 
21, 2012, 8:28 PM), http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/46584d1e-baee-11e1-81e0-
00144feabdc0.html#axzz281fMMmAL. 
91 Id. 
92 Comment for Proposed Rule 77 FR 41213, Steven Maijoor for the European 
Securities and Markets Authority (ESMA), supra note 39, at 3.  
93 Memorandum from Shearman & Sterling, LLP, supra note 38, at 5. 
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regulations.  The issues raised by many of the comments to the 
proposed guidance revealed a number of flaws with the CFTC’s 
initial proposal regarding substituted compliance.  
To emphasize how strongly they opposed the proposed 
guidance, the financial authorities from the EU, France, Japan, and 
the U.K. not only submitted comments to the proposed guidance in 
August 2012, but also reiterated their position on October 17, 
2012, in a joint letter to Chairman Gensler.  The letter stated “it is 
critical to avoid taking steps that risk a withdrawal from global 
financial markets into inevitably less-efficient regional or national 
markets.”94  The letter further urged the CFTC to partner with its 
foreign counterparts to “collectively adopt cross-border rules 
consistent with the principle that equivalence or substituted 
compliance with respect to partner jurisdictions . . . should be used 
as far as possible to avoid fragmentation of global markets."95 
 
F. The European Approach 
 
The European Market and Infrastructure Regulation 
(“EMIR”) contains the European Union’s post-financial crisis legal 
reforms with respect to swaps. Just as the CFTC has drafted rules 
related to Dodd-Frank, the ESMA clarified EMIR by developing 
technical standards that were published on September 27, 2012.96  
Article 13(2) of Regulation No. 648/2012 of the European 
Parliament and of the Council on OTC Derivatives, Counterparties 
and Trade Repositories specifically outlines the EU’s version of 
substituted compliance.  The provision states: 
 
The Commission may adopt implementing acts 
declaring that the legal, supervisory and 
enforcement arrangements of a third country: (a) 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
94 Vladimir Guevarra, EU, Japan Warn Against New US Swaps Rules, WALL ST. 
J. (Oct. 18, 2012, 12:32 PM), http://online.wsj.com/article/ 
SB10000872396390444734804578064600691285288.html (quoting directly 
from a letter to CFTC Chairman Gary Gensler that was signed by European 
Commission Internal Market Commissioner Michel Barnier, French Finance 
Minister Pierre Moscovici, U.K. Chancellor of the Exchequer George Osborne 
and Japanese Minister of State for Financial Services Ikko Nakatsuka). 
95 Id. 
96 ESMA Defines Standards for Derivatives and CCPs, EUR. SEC. AND MKTS. 
AUTH. (Sept. 9, 2012), http://www.esma.europa.eu/news/ESMA-defines-
standards-derivatives-and-CCPs. 
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are equivalent to the requirements laid down in 
this Regulation under Articles 4, 9, 10, and 11; 
(b) ensure protection of professional secrecy that 
is equivalent to that set out in this Regulation; 
and (c) are being effectively applied and 
enforced in an equitable and non-distortive 
manner so as to ensure effective supervision and 
enforcement in that country.97 
 
The clear distinction between the EU’s version of substituted 
compliance and the one proposed by the CFTC in the proposed 
guidance is that the comparability analysis is done based on the 
nation’s regulatory scheme as a whole, not through an examination 
of an individual firm and its activities.  Thus, non-European 
regulated institutions would be allowed to transact swaps business 
on the European markets if the ESMA declares the regulatory 
structure from their home countries to be equivalent.98  The 
clearing, reporting, and risk management requirements of EMIR 
will all be considered satisfied where at least one of the 
counterparties to the swap transaction is regulated by a third 
country with an equivalent regulatory framework.99  By permitting 
equivalent regulations to satisfy transaction-level requirements in 
this manner, EMIR creates a more workable regime for non-EU 
entities and alleviates some of the burden on its own resources that 
would otherwise be needed to extend its authority extraterritorially. 
Because EMIR is a regulation, it has direct effect on all EU 
member states.100  This is in contrast to an EU directive which 
requires member states to implement specific requirements through 
domestic laws, likely resulting in inconsistent polices across the 
EU.101  This uniformity throughout the EU is one of the arguments 
the ESMA relied upon in calling for the CFTC to apply substituted 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
97 Regulation 648/2012, art. 13, of the European Parliament and of the Council 
of July 4, 2012 on OTC Derivatives, Counterparties and Trade Repositories, 
2012 O.J. (L 201) 24, 25. 
98 Memorandum from Shearman & Sterling, LLP, supra note 38. 
99 Id. at 6. 
100 Holman Fenwick Willan, Introduction to the European Market Infrastructure 
Regulation, REGULATORY BULLETIN APRIL 2011 (April 2011), 
http://www.hfw.com/publications/bulletins/regulatory-bulletin-april-
2011/regulatory-bulletin-april-2011-introduction-to-the-european-market-
infrastructure-regulation. 
101 Id. 
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compliance to all EU regulated swaps institutions.102  Great 
Britain’s Financial Services Authority, now known as the Financial 
Conduct Authority,103 and the French Minister of Economy and 
Finance echoed the ESMA in arguing that an equivalence system 
like the one employed by EMIR would avoid unworkable 
regulatory overlaps - like those presented by conflicting U.S. 
disclosure requirements and European bank secrecy laws - while 
simultaneously providing effective oversight of the markets.104  
The ESMA even offered to aid the CFTC in determining the best 
manner to apply an EU-wide substituted compliance approach.105  
Additionally, EU Commissioner Michel Barnier argued “where the 
rules of another country are comparable and consistent with the 
objectives of U.S. law, it is reasonable to expect US authorities to 
rely on those rules and recognize activities regulated under them as 
compliance. We in the EU can do exactly the same.”106  Thus, the 
European Commission also demonstrated a willingness to closely 
partner with the U.S. to ensure that no transaction or entity 
involving EU or U.S. counterparties will go unregulated.107 
 
G. The Evolution of Substituted Compliance 
 
The CFTC first backpedaled on the version of substituted 
compliance that it described in the proposed guidance in a 
December 4, 2012, joint press statement with several of its foreign 
counterparts in which it agreed that substituted compliance 
determinations “will not be undertaken on a firm by firm basis but 
rather will focus on the applicable regime in a jurisdiction and will 
entail a review of laws, rules, supervision and enforcement.”108  
Leading up to the issuance of the final interpretive guidance, the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
102 Comment for Proposed Rule 77 Fed. Reg. 41213, Steven Maijoor for the 
European Securities and Markets Authority (ESMA), supra note 39. 
103 FINANCIAL SERVICES AUTHORITY, Journey to the Financial Conduct 
Authority, http://www.fsa.gov.uk/about/what/reg_reform/fca.  
104 Comment for Proposed Rule 77 Fed. Reg. 41213, French Minister of 
Economy and Finance, supra note 34; see also Comment for Proposed Rule 77 
Fed. Reg. 41213, David Lawton for Financial Services Authority (UK), Aug. 24, 
2012, available at http://comments.cftc.gov/PublicComments/ViewComment. 
aspx?id=58433&SearchText=. 
105 Comment for Proposed Rule 77 Fed. Reg. 41213, Steven Maijoor for the 
European Securities and Markets Authority (ESMA), supra note 39. 
106 Barnier, supra note 90. 
107 Id.  
108 Press Release, supra note 29. 
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CFTC worked extensively with its EU counterparts.109  The 
collaboration between the CFTC and the European Union is most 
evident when considering how the approach to substituted 
compliance in the final interpretive guidance is more reflective of 
the EU’s approach than what was originally outlined in the 
proposed guidance. 
Pursuant to the final interpretive guidance, foreign 
regulators, an individual non-U.S entity, a group of non-U.S. 
entities, a U.S. bank that is a swap dealer or MSP with respect to 
its foreign branches, or a trade association, or other group on 
behalf of similarly situated entities are all eligible to apply 
substituted compliance by requesting a comparability 
determination of their home jurisdiction.110  Furthermore, “once a 
comparability determination is made for a jurisdiction, it will apply 
for all entities or transactions in that jurisdiction to the extent 
provided in the determination, as approved by the Commission.111 
Although the final interpretive guidance alters certain 
controversial policies contained in the proposed guidance and 
attempts to address the concerns regarding extraterritorial 
overreaching, as Commissioner Scott O’Malia argued in his 
Dissenting Statement, the CFTC has taken a flawed approach to 
harmonizing its regulatory framework.112  Instead of offering a 
clear expression on the cross-border application of the swaps 
provisions of Dodd-Frank that truly reflects cooperation with its 
foreign counterparts, the CFTC rushed to release the final 
interpretive guidance before it had worked out all of the details 
relating to substituted compliance.113  The final interpretive 
guidance counters Commissioner O’Malia’s assertion by noting 
that “no international consensus has emerged regarding the 
implementation of such reforms or the circumstances under which 
substituted compliance should be permitted.”114  Although this 
statement supports the CFTC’s position to move forward absent an 
internationally harmonized framework, the of lack of clarity that 
still surrounds substituted compliance should have persuaded the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
109 Brush, supra note 31. 
110 Interpretive Guidance and Policy Statement Regarding Compliance with 
Certain Swap regulations, supra note 45, at 45344.  
111 Id. 
112 Id.  
113 Id. at 45373–45374.  
114 Id. at 45322.  
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CFTC to extend the December 2012 exemptive order to provide 
the necessary time for continued collaboration with foreign 
regulators and thus, the issuance of more complete guidance.  
As it stands now, the CFTC stated that the comparability 
analysis required to determine if substituted compliance will apply 
to an entity “may be made on a requirement-by-requirement basis 
rather than on the basis of the foreign regime as a whole.”115  The 
CFTC does indicate that “once a comparability determination is 
made for a jurisdiction, it will apply for all entities or transactions 
in that jurisdiction to the extent provided in the determination.”116  
It is quite possible that, in practice, the CFTC will grant substituted 
compliance to the key jurisdictions around the world in which 
swap dealers transact business.  However, the final interpretive 
guidance provides no promises that this will be the case, and 
merely indicates that it will continue to work with foreign 
regulators and entities to resolve issues.117  Additional time and 
greater collaboration prior to releasing the interpretive guidance 
would have allowed for a more concrete policy regarding the 
application of substituted compliance.  
 
 
II. STRIKING THE BALANCE 
 
Financial juggernauts JPMorgan Chase & Co, Bank of 
America, Citigroup, HSBC, and Goldman Sachs collectively 
control about ninety-six percent of cash and derivatives trading.118  
The fact that four of these five entities are U.S. based companies 
does suggest that because the U.S. is such a major swaps player it 
should have an influential role in designing the global framework 
that will regulate the swaps market.  However, taking the lead on 
this matter does not necessarily mean that the CFTC should act 
without recognizing the need for a coordinated effort with its 
foreign counterparts.  Achieving the stated goal of safeguarding 
against systemic risks requires a more globally harmonized and 
concrete approach than the one articulated in the final interpretive 
guidance.  The potential that non-U.S. swap dealers and MSPs will 
be faced with unworkable regulatory obligations if they are not 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
115 Id. at 45323.  
116 Id. at 45344. 
117 Id. at 45345.  
118 Alper & Lynch, supra note 56. 
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granted substituted compliance warrants hashing out the details of 
substituted compliance with foreign jurisdictions as quickly as 
possible now that the interpretive guidance has gone into effect.   
 
A. Interpretive Guidance vs. Formal Rulemaking 
 
By issuing a proposed guidance prior to the final 
interpretive guidance, the CFTC provided a medium for interested 
parties to submit comments and recommendations to assist in its 
consideration of how to carry out its oversight of the swaps 
industry.  Some have criticized the fact that the CFTC chose to 
issue guidance instead of a rule.119  Interpretive guidance is meant 
to better explain the requirements already contained within the 
CEA. It is not intended to create any new rights or obligations.120  
Additionally, the final interpretive guidance on the cross-border 
reach of the swaps regulations is not binding on the agency.121  It 
only serves as an indication of how the CFTC will likely apply the 
CEA in practice.122  
There could be a number of reasons why the CFTC chose 
this route. First, interpretive guidance does not require compliance 
with the Administrative Procedure Act (the “APA”).123  This 
allows the agency to clarify industry concerns more quickly and 
avoid expending resources to meet procedural requirements.124  
Faced with a tight deadline for implementation, the CFTC may 
have considered it important to promptly respond to the confusion 
expressed by foreign entities and regulators. Dodd-Frank directed 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
119 See Jill Sommers, Commissioner, U.S. Commodities Futures Trading 
Comm’n, Statement of Concurrence: (1) Proposed Interpretive Guidance and 
Policy Statement Regarding Section 2(i) of the Commodity Exchange Act; and 
(2) Notice of Proposed Exemptive Order (June 29, 2012) (transcript available at 
http://www.cftc.gov/PressRoom/SpeechesTestimony/ 
sommersstatement062912). 
120 Cross-Border Application of Certain Swaps Provisions of the Commodity 
Exchange, supra note 4, at 41214. 
121 See WILLIAM F. FUNK ET AL., ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE AND PRACTICE: 
PROBLEMS AND CASES 345 (4th ed. 2010) (noting that interpretive rules, 
although expositive of an existing law or statute, are neither binding upon those 
subject to the law or statute, or the issuing agency). 
122 See Id. at 345 (stating that the interpretive rules, while note binding and 
creative of no new duties, have legal significance). 
123 Sommers, supra note 119. 
124  See FUNK ET AL., supra note 121, at 345. 
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the CFTC to draft more than 50 rules.125  This task has been 
characterized as “Herculean,” given the fact that the CFTC 
typically only issues three or four rules per year.126  The CFTC 
may also want to see how the swaps market operates under the 
guidance and gauge the industry reaction to its intended policy 
without binding itself to any rules that may prove ineffective or 
impractical.  Interpretive guidance allows an agency to more easily 
alter its position than a rule; an option the CFTC may wish to keep 
open in the coming years.127  Because interpretive guidance is not 
subject to the procedural requirements of the APA, the agency was 
not obligated to conduct a cost-benefit analysis before issuing it.128  
It is somewhat troubling to the business community that the CFTC 
has provided for such a sweeping application of its authority 
without offering any indication of the cost of such an approach.129 
 Regardless of the CFTC’s motives for offering 
interpretative guidance instead of promulgating a binding rule, the 
final interpretive guidance is indicative of how the agency intends 
to enforce the CEA, at least at these early stages of the regulation 
of the swaps industry.  Consequently, the July 2012 proposed 
guidance prompted a great deal of attention from the swaps 
industry domestically and abroad when it was issued and the 
request for comments was made.  
 
B. The Presumption Should Be in Favor of Granting 
Substituted Compliance to Entities Registered With Other 
G20 Members 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
125 Scott D. O’Malia, Commissioner, U.S. Commodities Futures Trading 
Comm’n., Smart Regulatory Reform and the Perils of High-Frequency 
Regulation (May 31, 2012) (transcript available at http://www.cftc.gov/ 
PressRoom/SpeechesTestimony/opaomalia-14. 
126 Christian Johnson, Regulatory Arbitrage, Extraterritorial Jurisdiction and 
Dodd-Frank: The Implications of US Global OTC Derivative Regulation, 
SOCIAL SCIENCE RESEARCH NETWORK, 24 (Oct. 30, 2012), 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2169401. 
127 See FUNK ET AL., supra note 121, at 355 (noting that the non-binding nature 
of an interpretive rule allows its issuing agency to readjust its approach to the 
rule being explained). 
128 Sommers, supra note 119 (stating that the Commission, because of the 
nomenclature of the current proposal, is neither bound by the requirements of 
the Administrative Procedure Act, nor the Commodity Exchange Act to 
“conduct a cost-benefit analysis”). 
129 Id. (citing the “extraterritorial reach of the Dodd-Frank Act” and a possible 
alternative that may avoid costly or duplicative regulations). 
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The CFTC’s limited resources, coupled with concerns over 
international comity indicate that the CFTC should establish a 
presumption in favor of applying substituted compliance to foreign 
swap entities that are registered in and regulated by other G20 
members who continue to exhibit a commitment to the principles 
set forth at the 2009 Summit.  The interpretive guidance states that 
through collaboration with the EU, the CFTC staff determined that 
the “EU has adopted risk mitigation rules that are essentially 
identical to certain provisions of the Commission’s business 
conduct standards for swap dealers and MSPs.”130  Accordingly the 
CFTC “determined that where a swap/OTC derivative is subject to 
concurrent jurisdiction under U.S. and EU risk mitigation rules, 
compliance under EMIR will achieve compliance with the relevant 
Commission rules because they are essentially identical.”131 
The CFTC should use the same collaborative approach that 
it took with the EU to work with jurisdictions that exhibit a similar 
willingness to negotiate and also recognize the benefits of 
developing complementary regulatory oversight of the swaps 
industry.  Each G20 member has expressed a commitment to 
shared goals with respect to the regulation of the OTC derivatives 
markets and, therefore, it is likely that the financial authorities in 
those nations are willing to work with the CFTC in the same 
manner as the EU.132  
Establishing a presumption in favor of granting substituted 
compliance to entities that are registered with other G20 members 
would most effectively carry out the CFTC’s mandates to “reduce 
risk, increase transparency, and promote market integrity”133 and to 
“consult and coordinate with foreign regulatory authorities.”134  
Moreover, such a presumption would result in foreign jurisdictions 
monitoring more swaps dealers, market participants, and swap 
transactions.  This would lessen the CFTC’s oversight burden with 
respect to non-U.S. entities, thereby, conserving scarce resources 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
130 Interpretive Guidance and Policy Statement Regarding Compliance with 
Certain Swap regulations; Rule, 78 Fed. Reg. 45292, 45353 (Jul. 26, 2013). 
131 Interpretive Guidance and Policy Statement Regarding Compliance with 
Certain Swap regulations; Rule, 78 Fed. Reg. 45292, 45353 (Jul. 26, 2013). 
132 Cross-Border Application of Certain Swaps Provisions of the Commodity 
Exchange, supra note 4, at 41215. 
133 See Press Release, supra note 63. 
13415 U.S.C. § 8325 (2010). 
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and avoiding the waste and inefficiency of duplicative regulations 
without sacrificing investor protection or market integrity. 
 
C. The CFTC’s Limited Resources 
 
Because the CFTC chose to clarify how it would apply the 
CEA extraterritorially in the form of interpretive guidance, instead 
of a binding rule, the agency avoided compliance with the 
requirements of the APA.135  This meant that the CFTC was not 
required to engage in a cost-benefit analysis of its approach.136  
Both the CFTC and the SEC have recently lost lawsuits brought by 
industry groups challenging the adequacy of the agencies’ cost-
benefit analyses.137  This could suggest that the CFTC was hoping 
to avoid litigation related to a cost-benefit analysis by choosing the 
interpretive guidance route.  However, former Commissioner Jill 
Sommers138 suggested that the failure to conduct such an analysis 
could actually expose the CFTC to litigation.139  In its comment to 
the proposed guidance, the International Swaps and Derivatives 
Association (“ISDA”) argued that the proposed guidance was 
mischaracterized as interpretive guidance and could actually be 
deemed a proposed legislative rule.140  As to the final interpretive 
guidance, Commissioner O’Malia argued in his dissent that the 
interpretive guidance “has a practical binding effect and should 
have been promulgated as a legislative rule under the APA”141  
This could be grounds for a legal challenge and the basis of a 
defense to enforcement actions brought by the CFTC.  Regardless 
of the fact that the CFTC characterized the finalized guidance as 
interpretive guidance, a court could still hold that it is in fact a 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
135 Sommers, supra note 119. 
136 Id. 
137 Sarah Lynch, U.S. Regulator Calls for Do-Over on Cross-Border Swaps 
Plan, REUTERS (Nov. 13, 2012), http://currents.westlawbusiness.com/ 
Article.aspx?id=23cf58af-b633-440a-9938-522880080e8f&cid=&src=&sp=. 
138 Commissioner Sommers announced her resignation from the CFTC on 
January 24, 2013 and officially resigned on July 8, 2013. See Press Release, 
Commissioner Jill Sommers Announces her Resignation, Release PR6502-13 
(Jan. 24, 2013), http://www.cftc.gov/PressRoom/PressReleases/pr6502-13; see 
also http://cftc.gov/About/Commissioners/FormerCommissioners/index.htm. 
139 Sommers, supra note 119. 
140 Comment for Proposed Rule 77 Fed. Reg. 41213, Chris Young for the 
International Swaps and Derivatives Association, supra note 78. 
141 Interpretive Guidance and Policy Statement Regarding Compliance with 
Certain Swap regulations; Rule, 78 Fed. Reg. 45292, 45373 (Jul. 26, 2013).  
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legislative rule and was, therefore, subject to the procedural 
requirements of the APA.142  
 In a speech following the issuance of the proposed 
guidance, Commissioner O’Malia also expressed concern over the 
fact that a failure to conduct a cost-benefit analysis prevented 
market participants from commenting on the analysis.143  
Consequently, those who commented on the proposed guidance 
were left to speculate on potential costs of compliance and were 
unable to offer concrete arguments regarding its financial impact.  
Perhaps most importantly though, it raises the unsettling possibility 
that the CFTC did not meaningfully consider the costs of its 
proposed guidance or the final interpretive guidance.  ISDA 
echoed Commissioner O’Malia’s view that a cost-benefit analysis 
should be conducted and also asserted that failure to do so “risks 
appearing arbitrary.”144  ISDA again alluded to further grounds 
upon which a party could challenge the legality of the CFTC’s 
interpretive guidance as a court can set aside an agency action if it 
finds that action was applied arbitrarily.145  The fact that ISDA 
raised multiple grounds upon which a lawsuit could be based in its 
comment to the proposed guidance that were not resolved by the 
final interpretive guidance suggests the CFTC should anticipate the 
possibility of potentially costly litigation.  
In addition to any expenses related to defending its policies 
in court, the CFTC must also consider the cost of actually 
enforcing these regulations.  In accordance with the interpretive 
guidance, the CFTC has tasked itself with overseeing at least some 
of the entity level and transaction level requirements of any swap 
transaction in which at least one of the parties is a U.S person or a 
foreign branch of a U.S. swap dealer, with many these transactions 
not being eligible for substituted compliance.146  Thus, the 
theoretical cost of enforcing the swaps regulations broadly to non-
U.S. entities, even absent a thorough cost-benefit analysis, should 
strongly motivate the CFTC to rely more heavily on substituted 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
142 FUNK ET AL., supra note 121, at 339. 
143 O’Malia, supra note 125. 
144 Comment for Proposed Rule 77 FR 41213, Chris Young for the International 
Swaps and Derivatives Association, supra note 78. 
145 See 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (1966). 
146 Memorandum from Davis Polk & Wardwell, LLP, CFTC Finalizes Cross-
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compliance and its foreign counterparts where appropriate.  
According to Commissioner O’Malia, “The [CFTC] does not have 
the resources to register and regulate all market participants and 
swaps activities.”147  CFTC Commissioner Mark Wetjen expressed 
a similar concern when he stated in a speech at the 2012 Annual 
North American Conference of the International Swaps and 
Derivatives Association on September 13, 2012, “given the 
Commission’s limited resources, as well as its currently limited 
view of these markets, we should cast our net only as wide as 
necessary to protect the public.”148  
 By relying on its foreign counterparts through a robust 
substituted compliance standard, the CFTC would alleviate some 
of the economic and non-economic costs of regulating a 
voluminous and international base without sacrificing the integrity 
of the market.  Moreover, the CFTC’s limited resources could 
prevent the agency from effectively monitoring the domestic 
entities it regulates and restrict its ability to enforce the law.149  By 
allowing foreign regulators to oversee entities and transactions 
with less significant connections to the U.S., the CFTC could 
better focus its resources on those activities that truly threaten 
domestic market integrity.  Therefore, it is in everyone’s interest 
for the CFTC to act swiftly to coordinate with foreign regulators 
and complete comparative determinations as soon as possible to 
enable the application of substituted compliance to entities and 
transactions that have less significant ties to the U.S. 
 
D. Costs and Consequences for Market Participants 
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In addition to concerns that the CFTC does not have the 
resources to effectively apply the swaps provisions in the manner 
described in the interpretive guidance, the expected economic and 
non-economic costs for market participants are also an issue.  
Standard and Poor’s analysts estimate that large swaps dealers will 
experience a decrease in annual revenue between $4 billion and 
$4.5 billion as a result of the new regulations.150  The burden of 
falling within the scope of the U.S. swaps regulations could 
encourage market participants to seek out less restrictive 
jurisdictions within which to transact business.  This conduct is 
known as regulatory arbitrage.151  The fear that restrictive swaps 
regulation would lead to regulatory arbitrage has existed since 
early on in the process of developing the new policies.152  Certain 
Asian markets may be appealing targets for such conduct as Asia 
did not experience the same leverage-related issues that wreaked 
havoc on the West.  Therefore, Asian regulators may be less 
inclined to adopt restrictive policies.153  However, Asia may not 
ultimately be that much more attractive than the U.S. and EU. 
Ashley Alder, chief executive of Hong Kong’s Securities and 
Futures Commission, has urged Asian regulators to adopt 
restrictive regulatory reforms in line with the West.  Mr. Alder 
asserted “it would be unbelievably stupid to try and grow the Asian 
financial system while ignoring the problems that arose in the 
west.”154  Mr. Alder further argued, “there is no advantage in 
lowering our standards in order to attract business. That kind of 
regulatory arbitrage always ends in tears.”155 
Because the CFTC has broad powers to regulate 
extraterritorially under Section 2(i) of the CEA as amended by 
Section 722 of Dodd-Frank, the CFTC could attempt to curb 
regulatory arbitrage by maximizing its reach abroad.  This may 
have been one of the motivating factors behind the broad approach 	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taken in the proposed guidance.156  However, former Treasury 
Secretary Timothy Geithner stated in a letter to Senator Harry Reid 
in 2009 that coordination with foreign regulators was needed to 
combat regulatory arbitrage.157  Accordingly, a more effective way 
for the U.S. to prevent regulatory arbitrage is to work closely with 
its foreign counterparts to ensure that regulations are 
comparable.158  Acting unilaterally motivates market participants 
to search for ways around the CFTC’s oversight, whereas a 
collaborative approach involving many jurisdictions makes 
evading regulatory requirements much more challenging because it 
reduces the number of less restrictive jurisdictions.  That the final 
interpretive guidance describes a potentially more extensive 
application of substituted compliance suggests that the CFTC has 
heeded the advice of the comments it received to the proposed 
guidance and is working more collaboratively with foreign 
regulators.  However, uncertainty still surrounds substituted 
compliance because the final interpretive guidance indicates that 
the use of substituted compliance requires an eligible party to make 
a request for the CFTC to conduct a comparative determination 
that could deny the application of substituted compliance entirely 
or apply only to certain requirements.  Accordingly, it remains to 
be seen if regulatory arbitrage will become a significant issue as 
the swaps industry evolves under the new regulations. 
In addition to potentially promoting regulatory arbitrage, a 
restrictive application of substituted compliance could also harm 
U.S. swaps dealers by making them less attractive counterparties to 
foreign entities.159  Critics of the proposed guidance have argued 
that the burden of U.S. regulations could cause foreign market 
participants to avoid doing business in the U.S. or engaging in 
transactions with U.S. swaps dealers.160  Asian banks have 
apparently already begun limiting their derivatives transactions 
with U.S. counterparties as a result of regulatory concerns.161  
Brazil’s Securities and Exchange Commission has also indicated 
that Brazilian institutions could be discouraged from engaging in 	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swaps transactions with U.S. firms.162  A widespread refusal to 
deal could substantially harm U.S. entities due to the frequency 
with which they enter into transactions with non-U.S. entities.  
Given that swaps provide important liquidity and risk management 
for U.S. entities, eliminating their ability to transact with non-U.S. 
entities could hurt the U.S. economy.163  Additionally, some U.S. 
swaps dealers are major liquidity providers in certain emerging 
markets.164  Such conduct may be curbed if U.S. swaps dealers are 
made less attractive counterparties because of U.S. regulations.165  
This could do financial harm to both U.S. swaps dealers and 
emerging markets, which would otherwise provide attractive 
investment opportunities for U.S. firms.  The anticipated effect of 
the new regulations has reportedly already threatened Singapore’s 
OTC swaps trading as market participants look for alternative 
investment options to avoid falling within the CEA’s registration 
requirement.166 
While it is important that the CFTC take into consideration 
concerns over the ability of U.S. firms to remain competitive in the 
swaps market in the face of the new regulatory framework, there is 
a limit to how far the agency should go in its application of 
substituted compliance.  In its comment to the proposed guidance, 
Goldman Sachs urged the CFTC to make U.S. swap dealers 
“eligible for substituted compliance for transaction-level 
requirements to the same extent as non-U.S. swap dealers and non-
U.S. branches of U.S. swap dealers.”167  This suggestion misses the 
point of substituted compliance, which is intended to combat 
potential conflicts of law, prevent swap dealers and MSPs from 
complying with duplicative requirements of multiple jurisdictions, 	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and conform to international comity concerns.  Where a market 
participant is unequivocally a “U.S. person,” as is the case with 
Goldman Sachs, there is no doubt that U.S. regulators have a 
compelling interest in regulating its conduct in the swaps market.  
Although Goldman Sachs may be correct in asserting that a failure 
to apply substituted compliance to U.S. entities will put such 
entities at a competitive disadvantage, the same could be true for 
foreign counterparties who are complying with their respective 
jurisdiction’s regulations.   
 
E. International Comity 
 
The CFTC has explicitly stated that in interpreting and 
applying its authority it will be mindful of the principles of 
international comity.168  Commissioner Wetjen has argued that “as 
an initial matter, the law is clear that principles of international 
comity, and a healthy respect for the sovereign authority of other 
nations, are an integral part of determining the proper extra-
territorial application of federal statutes.”169  The doctrine of 
international comity provides that a court, using its own discretion, 
will defer to foreign laws and dismiss a case brought under U.S. 
law where the interests of the foreign nation involved outweigh 
domestic concerns.170  This underlying principle translates into the 
regulatory context as well.  Where a foreign interest in regulating a 
swap dealer, MSP, or swap transaction is stronger than the U.S. 
interest – as may be the case with the earlier example of a swap 
transaction between an EU entity and an EU based Citibank branch 
– U.S. regulators should defer to their European counterparts and 
allow the ESMA to oversee the transaction.  
 The Supreme Court has held that Congress must manifest 
an intent for a statute to apply exterritorialy in order for it to be 
applicable.171  Section 2(i) of the CEA demonstrates that Congress 
did expressly intend for the CEA to apply extraterritorially in 
circumstances where the foreign conduct has “a direct and 	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significant connection with activities in, or effect on, commerce of 
the United States.”172  This same provision also gives the CFTC 
the power to promulgate cross-border regulations where it deems it 
“necessary or appropriate to prevent the evasion of” the CEA.173  
At the same time, Section 752(a) of Dodd-Frank tempers these 
grants of authority by instructing the CFTC to “consult and 
coordinate with foreign regulatory authorities on the establishment 
of consistent international standards.”174  These mandates require 
the CFTC to balance the interests of the U.S. in protecting its own 
markets with those of foreign regulators where international 
coordination would provide for more effective regulation.  To 
apply the principles of international comity to this balance, the 
CFTC must weigh the foreign interest at stake and determine if 
deference to that foreign regulatory body is appropriate.  The 
CFTC has asserted that the term “U.S. person” can assist in 
determining the weight of the U.S. interest,” meaning that, when 
the entity would be considered a “U.S. person,” the U.S. interest 
would outweigh the foreign interest.175  However, an unnecessarily 
expansive definition of a U.S. person renders this argument less 
persuasive. 
 As the First Circuit stated in United States v. Nippon Paper 
Industries Co., “comity is more an aspiration than a fixed rule.”176  
Thus, the CFTC is not bound by the doctrine of international 
comity beyond what is mandated by the CEA in terms of 
consulting and coordinating with its foreign counterparts.177  
Nevertheless, what makes international comity important in the 
context of regulating swaps is its relevance to maintaining strong 
relationships with foreign regulators.  The critical reaction of so 
many foreign regulators to the proposed guidance is indicative of 
their expectation that the U.S. would respect their authority 
especially given the shared goal of ensuring market integrity and 
avoiding future financial crises.  Adherence to the principles of 
international comity allows the CFTC to demonstrate this respect 
and maintain its partnerships abroad through deference to foreign 	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regulators within their own jurisdictions and where their interests 
are strongest.  
 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
 The approach to substituted compliance set forth in the 
final interpretive guidance is a significant improvement over what 
was issued in the proposed guidance.  However, the non-binding 
nature of interpretive guidance coupled with the uncertainty still 
present in the CFTC’s outline of substituted compliance creates 
“statutorily weak guidance, with all its no-action riders and 
exemptions, with only the promise of further negotiation with our 
foreign counterparts.”178  These existing ambiguities should be 
corrected through ongoing negotiations with foreign regulators as 
soon as possible to avoid burdening the markets with duplicative 
and conflicting rules.  Furthermore, in the interest of preserving 
resources and respecting the sovereignty of other nations, the 
CFTC should establish a presumption that G20 members have 
comparable regulatory frameworks. 
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